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Abstract: In this essay mathematics is conceived of as intentional human activity.  Since 
intention implies choice, there are ethical dimensions to making mathematical choices.  
Embracing these dimensions requires acknowledging the contextual nature of mathematics.  First 
John Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics and a reconsideration of mathematical empiricism are 
posited as ways to foster a context sensitive understanding of mathematics.  Next, I address the 
ways in which existent conceptions of mathematics—even those which support reform in 
mathematics education—are insufficient with regard to their ability to recognize its human 
dimensions.  The essay concludes with a distinction between mathematics education that ethically 
applies existing versions of mathematics and mathematics education that seeks to recast 
mathematics as a necessarily and undeniably ethical enterprise.   
 
 
 
All of that time where did it go? 
What did you do and what have you got to show for it? 
Doin’ the math is kind of a bummer  
You best avoid crunchin’ that number 
 
Where are they now and what are they doin’? 
Everyone’s ancient at your high school reunion 
Doin’ the math don’t bring satisfaction 
There’s no more addition now it’s all subtraction 
 
A monkey, a dog, a horse, a giraffe 
They’re all gonna die but they don’t do the math 
Doin’ the math is kind of a bummer  
You best avoid crunchin’ that number 
                           --Singer-songwriter Loudon Wainwright III, from Doin’ the Math 
 
A central argument of this paper is that mathematics is an intentional human activity and that—
since intention implies choice—there are ethical dimensions to making mathematical choices.  
Embracing these connections requires moving away from how we typically conceive of 
mathematics.  Accenting the intentional aspects of engaging in mathematical activity is one 
effective way to counter the predominant ways of thinking about mathematics and mathematical 
knowledge, namely that it is different in kind than most other forms of knowledge.  Blurring the 
                                                 
1 krstemhagen@vcu.edu 
Stemhagen 
 
sharp distinctions between mathematics and other activity/knowledge makes possible new ways 
to think about mathematics in the context of its teaching and learning.   
 
As I sat down to begin the task of writing this paper, the first strains of Doin’ the Math emanated 
from my office computer speakers.  The song is a wry but somewhat bleak account of the 
inevitability of growing old.  When Wainwright refers to “doin’ the math” what he presumably 
means is something akin to thinking about aging, dwelling on the inevitable, or something along 
those lines.  I doubt that the songwriter was trying to make a profound philosophical statement 
about the nature of mathematics and yet, to my ear—toward the song’s end—that’s exactly what 
he did.  I was half-listening to the music when Wainwright crooned, “A monkey, a dog, a horse, a 
giraffe…they’re all gonna die but they don’t do the math.”   
 
Wainwright’s point, as I take it, is that the years are increasing for all of us, animal friends 
included, but that this increase in years is understood as adding only by humans.  This is 
significant, as it forms the basis of a powerful plain language philosophical counter-argument to 
the ubiquitous commonsense understanding of mathematics as beyond the human pale.  This 
extra-human, often Plato-inspired conceptualization of mathematics can best be summed up by 
the response I often get when I mention that my work considers what happens when we choose 
to think of mathematics as sets of tools humans have constructed to help solve our problems.  A 
common response is that this cannot be so and typically some version of the “if everyone on the 
planet died tomorrow 2+2 would still equal 4” argument is employed.  The power of 
Wainwright’s claim is that it suggests that if “everyone died tomorrow” mathematical activity 
would cease.  Certainly, giraffes and other animals would still be aging, but there would be no 
addition of years, as addition requires intentional activity. 
 
My sense is that getting people—particularly those responsible for mathematics teaching and 
curriculum design—to fundamentally change their way of conceiving of mathematics will require 
more than just Wainwright’s lyrics.  Thus, in this paper I argue for a recognition, even an 
embracing, of the human and hence, of the ethical dimensions of mathematics.  Andrew Ward 
(2007) argues similarly for recognition of the science-ethics connection.  In order for the two to 
be thought of as coexistent, he claims that science must be thought of differently; namely, its 
contextuality must be put in the foreground.  Here, I apply the same strategy with the 
mathematics-ethics connection, but with mathematics it is a tougher argument to make, as many 
mainstream versions of mathematics do not acknowledge that it has any context, let alone that we 
can choose to focus on contextual factors.  This paper is a call for such a reconceptualization.   
 
To support this call, I first provide a summary of John Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics—
positing it as a way to think about the nature of mathematics that requires acknowledgement of 
its contexts.  Next, I argue that in order for the context of mathematical activity to be 
appreciated, mathematical empiricism needs to be given consideration.  Next, I address the ways 
in which existent conceptions of mathematics—even those which support reform in mathematics 
education—are insufficient with regard to their ability to foster awareness of its context and 
hence its human dimensions.  In the final section of the paper, I make a distinction between 
mathematics education that ethically applies existing versions of mathematics and mathematics 
education that seeks to recast mathematics as a necessarily and undeniably ethical enterprise.   
 
What are generally taken to be sterile, extra-human, ethics-neutral mathematical knowledge and 
techniques have, to paraphrase William James, the trail of the human serpent all over them.  
  TMME, Vol5, no.1,p.61 
 
 
Simply saying so is insufficient and the case needs to be made that rethinking the nature of the 
mathematical enterprise can help us make meaningful mathematics-ethics connections and, 
subsequently, to pave the way for an engaging brand of school mathematics that draws 
sustenance from these connections.     
 
Dewey’s Psychology of Number: “Doin’ the Math” is the Math 
I probably found Wainwright’s song so compelling because it serves as the musical complement 
to one of Dewey’s central points about the nature of mathematics.  In The Psychology of Number and 
its Applications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic (1895), James McLellan and Dewey2 posit that 
mathematics exists when existential circumstances give way to a need for consideration of 
quantity.  Dewey surmises that mathematics originated when human questions turned from the 
crude question of “how much?” to the more refined query of “how many?”  Thus, from the start, 
Dewey frames mathematics in terms of its activity.  One of Dewey’s most potent (and humorous) 
quotes on this topic even employs an animal metaphor quite similar to Wainwright’s.  In making 
the point that mathematics is intentional human activity, Dewey claims, “There are hundreds of 
leaves on the tree in which the bird builds its nest, but it does not follow that the bird can count” 
(p. 23).     
 
Dewey’s unorthodox operationalization of the term “psychology” is crucial to understanding his 
philosophy of mathematics.  Contrary to most philosophers and philosophers of mathematics of 
his day, rather than viewing an individual’s psychology as an impediment to or distorting factor of 
clear apprehension of truth, Dewey saw it as a critical component of coming to know.  This is 
one reason why Psychology of Number, a philosophical look at how children come to grasp the 
concept of number, is such a clear expression of Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics.  That is, 
how children come to know mathematical concepts centers on the mental activities (i.e., 
psychology) of children as they encounter various empirical situations.  Dewey described this 
simple sense of quantity as coming about in light of the human need to measure in order to solve 
practical problems and to improve lives (p. 42).  
 
Dewey saw the commonly understood distinction between counting and measuring as getting in 
the way of understanding how children organically come to know number.  Counting relates to 
determining how many of something there are and measuring involves determination of how much 
of something there is.  In other words, the counting-measuring distinction relates to whether 
something is a series of parts of one whole, or a related group made up of individual units.  
Dewey’s pragmatic answer held that—depending on context— they may be either. The reasons 
the individual engaged in the mathematical activity in the first place must be taken into account 
when answering the question.  
 
Deweyan mathematics is defined and understood by its use.  The concept of a particular number 
(say three) does not reside within a group of three apples, beanbags or any other objects any 
more than it does in the symbol “3.”  Three, as a construct, emerges from activities requiring 
quantification as a means to an end.  Dewey’s accompanying pedagogy accordingly focuses on 
measurement, as all counting is measuring and all measuring is counting.  Making measurement 
the vehicle for mathematical explorations ensures, according to Dewey, that number symbols will 
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always be linked to concrete units and encourages active, empirically-oriented, and contextualized 
conceptions of mathematical enterprises.  Finally, Dewey understands measurement as taking 
place in contexts wider than simply the act of measuring.  He uses the measurement of a field as 
an example.  In a genuine mathematical inquiry, simply finding the area of the field will not 
meaningfully measure it.  To do so, wider contexts must be considered—that is, what is the field 
capable of producing?  How does it relate to our lives?  To answer these questions counting 
and/or measuring must be employed (e.g., amount of produce, the price it will bring at market, 
the costs of growing the produce, etc.).  Dewey sums up the ways in which mathematical 
inquiries are inseparable from our broader aims: “All numerical concepts and processes arise in 
the process of fitting together a number of minor acts in such a way as to constitute a complete 
and more comprehensive act” (p. 57).   
 
Any number of calculations could be done to measure the fields, but the ones that relate to how 
we actually live our lives are the calculations that will help us successfully conclude our inquiry.  
In other words, mathematics is more than just crudely counting or measuring; it requires 
thoughtful consideration about a multitude of contextual factors. Thus, Dewey’s version of 
mathematics emphasizes the interplay between empirical objects and our actions; it acknowledges 
the importance of the role of human intent in the construction of mathematical knowledge.  To 
Dewey, the development of mathematics is driven by the ways in which we use it.  In fact, it is 
not too strong of a claim to sum up Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics as mathematics is its 
use.  To borrow from (and add to) Wainwright lyrics, “doin’ the math” is the math. 
 
(Re)Opening the Door to Mathematical Empiricism 
While Dewey was certainly no simple mathematical empiricist, his attention to context, 
particularly physical contexts, possibly leaves him susceptible to critique from those skeptical of 
the place of empiricism in philosophy of mathematics.  By simple empiricism, I am referring to 
the idea that mathematics exists “out there” in the physical world.  That is, the reason why 
2+2=4 is because that is what is true in the physical world.  To the simple empiricist, the idea of 
number resides in the environment and one’s development of mathematical knowledge takes 
place as one observes the environment.  Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
make the case for a reconsideration of the merits of mathematical empiricism,3 it is interesting 
that Gottlob Frege’s attack on J.S. Mill’s mathematical empiricism had much to do with the 
subsequent marginalization of empiricism as a viable philosophy of mathematics (Kitcher, 1980).   
 
This event is noteworthy because the part of Mill’s position that Frege so savagely attacked was, 
by my read, actually the part whereby Mill went beyond that of a simple empiricist and treaded 
lightly into the territory of the mathematics-as-human-activity camp.  Mill claimed that “… Two 
pebbles and one pebble are equal to three pebbles…affirms that if we put one pebble to two 
pebbles, those very pebbles are three” (Mill, p. 168).  Here Mill suggests that there is a “we” 
required to “put” together the pebbles to make three.  I see this as a nascent affirmation of the 
human hand in the creation of mathematics.  Kitcher (1980) agrees, stating: “Thus the root 
notion in Mill’s ontology is that of a collecting, an activity of ours, rather that that of a collection, 
an abstract object (p. 224).  To Mill’s notion that number comes about from arranging objects, 
Frege responded: “if Mill is right, we are very lucky that not all objects in the world are nailed 
down, for otherwise it would be false that 2+1=3” (1997, p. 94).   
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If the premise that the contexts of mathematical inquiry matters is on the mark, then Frege’s 
critique is errant.  At first blush, it appears that Frege is attacking the notion that the truth of 
mathematical statements resides in physical contexts.  I think this misses the point, as “nailing 
down” objects prevents their arrangement and not their physical existence.  Clearly there is still a 
physical context, it is just that Frege’s idea of “nailed down” suggests a lack of mobility that, if it 
was actually the case, may very well have affected the direction of the development of 
mathematics.  If our physical reality was so different that our genuine inquiries had no need or 
place for the grouping of objects, it is difficult to imagine how (and maybe more importantly, 
why) mathematics as a discipline would have developed as it did.4 
 
All of this suggests Mill is not thinking like a simple empiricist—in focusing on the activity of 
arranging he is nodding toward the ways in which our choices (in this case choosing to engage in 
mathematical grouping) create mathematics.  Frege mischaracterized Mill’s point when he stated 
that without the moving of objects that addition would be false.  Dewey, Mill, and other non-
simple empiricists might argue that rather than false, without the need and ability to rearrange 
physical objects it might be that 2+1=3 would be irrelevant. 
 
With the tasks of brief explication of Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics and a quick plug for 
the merits of reconsidering empiricism in mathematics complete, let us consider how it is that 
such a way of thinking about mathematics and mathematics education can help to shed light on 
the intersections between mathematics and ethics.  Dewey’s description of the origins and nature 
of mathematics as emerging from willful human interaction with the environment is one way to 
make the case that the mathematics and ethics are inseparable.  If mathematics comes about as 
we engage in inquiries in order to live better in the world, it follows that ethics is never far from 
mathematics.     
 
What’s Wrong with the Ways We Think about School Mathematics? 
The “math wars” is a label given to the dispute between two mathematics education factions.  
Traditionalists or back-to-basics proponents argue that the aim of mathematics education should 
be mastery of a set body of mathematical knowledge and skills.  The philosophical complement 
to this version of the teaching and learning of mathematics is mathematical absolutism.  Reform-
oriented mathematics educators, on the other hand, tend to see understanding as a primary aim 
of school mathematics. Constructivism is often the philosophical foundation for those espousing 
this version of mathematics education.5   
 
Given this paper’s focus on the task of establishing the importance of human contexts to 
mathematics it should not be hard to see that the traditionalist’s point of view, to the degree that 
it conceives of mathematics class as a place for the transmission of preexistent, extra-human 
mathematical truths and skills, is not going to be of much value.  The more interesting claim is 
that reformers, to the degree that they rely on constructivism as an undergirding philosophical 
                                                 
4 For those who are questioning how it is that I can make the leap from children’s rudimentary 
mathematical understandings to the endeavors of contemporary professional mathematicians, I suggest 
reading Kitcher’s The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (1983).  In it, he works to link the simple origins of 
mathematics to today’s complex discipline.  
5 I do not wish to claim that philosophies and pedagogies correspond perfectly to one another.  Weber’s 
notion of selective affinity (1996) is useful here as while there are no hard fast rules, there seems to be a 
tendency for particular ways of thinking about mathematics to have some relation to certain pedagogies.   
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support also do not have much to offer with regard to the contextualization of mathematics.  
Reform mathematics has had to work against very firmly entrenched and stubborn traditional 
mainstream perceptions of mathematics.  As a result, some of its reliance on philosophical 
constructivism has fostered a preoccupation with the ways in which individual children make 
sense of new mathematical ideas in light of their existing understandings.  While I applaud the 
reform movement’s efforts to make school mathematics more learner-centered, this focus can 
lead to a mathematics education that is overly individual and cognitive.  The constructivist focus 
primarily on the individual’s construction of mathematical knowledge, can lead to neglect of 
other contextual factors, such as social and environmental factors.   
 
Toward a Strong Form of Contextual Recognition 
In an effort to answer a very important question—one that serves as the title of their essay—
What is Mathematics Education For?, Greer and Mukhopadhyay (2003) refer to a contemporary shift 
whereby mathematics is increasingly being thought of as a human activity with a requisite 
increase in “recognition of the historical, cultural, and social contexts of both mathematics and 
mathematics education” (p. 2).  While I embrace their vision of a mathematics education that 
recognizes these connections, I believe that for mathematics to play a meaningful role in making 
our world a more just place, we need to embrace a strong form of recognition of context and to 
move away from how we typically conceive of mathematics.  Furthermore, rethinking the 
purpose of school mathematics as a means to arm students with tools for social justice, while 
certainly an improvement over school mathematics as drill-and-kill or even as sets of isolated 
individual constructions, might miss the point.  It might miss the point because it is a post hoc 
application of mathematics to our social problems.  In other words, a strong form of recognition 
as to the historical, social, and cultural contexts of mathematics and mathematics education 
requires means that—in addition to using pre-decided upon mathematical knowledge and skills to 
improve our social circumstances—we need to acknowledge that mathematics itself is 
fundamentally historically, socially, and culturally situated.6  In other words, rather than simply 
finding ethical uses for mathematics, we need to teach mathematics in a way that recognizes that 
it is not different in kind than other enterprises (particularly ethical ones).  
  
Distinguishing between Ethics as Application and Inseparable, Meaningful 
Mathematics-Ethics Connections   
I have argued that Dewey’s philosophy of mathematics with a small dose of appreciation for the 
role of empiricism in mathematics is one way to pave the way for meaningful mathematics-ethic 
bonds.  In making this claim I have implied a distinction that I wish, at this point, to make 
explicit.  While still certainly not in the mainstream, there is much work being done to study the 
socio-ethical contexts and possibilities of school mathematics.   Moses and Cobb’s Radical 
Equations (2001) is a good example of the moral/ethical questions related to choosing to use 
school mathematics achievement as a sorting mechanism, whereby those who can make it 
through Algebra I get to go to college and those who don’t do not.  There are also ethical 
dimensions related to the performance of marginalized groups in math class.  While this certainly 
relates to Moses’ look at mathematics and poor Southern African-American students, scrutiny of 
the posited gender gap in mathematics performance is also a prime example of this mathematics-
                                                 
6 Jean Lave’s anthropological explorations of the situated nature of cognitive activity, particularly of 
mathematical thinking, provide a good point of departure for such acknowledgement.  See, for example, 
Lave, Murtaugh, and de la Rocha (1984).  
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ethics connection. Finally, there are clearly ethical dimensions related to choosing to apply 
mathematics in order to illuminate social justice issues, with Gutstein’s Reading and Writing the 
World with Mathematics (2006) serving as a recent example of this line of scholarship.  While I 
believe deeply in the worth of the social justice-oriented projects above, I see such efforts as 
consisting primarily of using mathematics as it exists in an ethical matter.  Although I would 
certainly never argue against the merits of using mathematics in an ethical matter, I believe that 
right-minded application is not the extent of the mathematics-ethics connection and that there 
are deeper, more fundamental connections that relate to the very origin and nature of 
mathematics.   
 
According to Dewey, the ethically fertile questions of how we can best arrange ourselves provide 
the origins of mathematics.  Thus, the distinction I am making is between ethics as application of 
existing mathematics for good intent versus the notion of a reconceptualization of mathematics 
as a fundamentally ethics-laden enterprise.7  There is a similar question hotly debated in 
philosophy of technology, where some argue that the commonsense understanding of technology 
as a neutral set of tools that can be used for good or ill ignores the ethics that are built into 
technological artifacts from the start (Winner, 1986).  Winner gives an example of such non-
neutrality by noting how the telephone, rather than being a neutral communication tool to be 
implemented by users as they see fit, possesses powerful tendencies toward certain social 
arrangements and has greatly contributed to fundamentally different social arrangements.  
Winner sums up this technological non-neutrality by asking: “As we make things work, what kind 
of world are we making?” (p. 17).  Part of his solution to this problem is to call for a 
reconciliation between the making and use of technology.  Winner sees our lack of understanding 
about technology as emerging from a sharp division of labor between those who make 
technological artifacts and those who consume them.   
 
Davis and Hersh (1981) similarly warn: “The social and physical worlds are being mathematized 
at an increasing rate.  The moral is: We’d better watch it, because too much of it may not be good 
for us” (p. xv).  One way to counter unchecked mathematization and the making-use distinction 
in mathematics education might be to help students experience some of what goes on in the 
world of those who are involved in the making of mathematics and in the mathematization of 
our experience.  Hersh (1997) explains mathematics as divided into two areas, front and back.  
The front is the highly polished finished product of mathematicians and the back is the area 
where mathematicians are busy engaging in the messy but often practically fruitful activities of 
mathematicians.  He uses the analogy of a restaurant.  In the dining room (front) everything is to 
appear orderly and under control.  Those in the front (students) are not privy to all that goes on 
behind the scenes (in the back) in order to create the seamless experience of dining in the front.   
 
The idea is that if students can get involved in the messy but engaging practices of mathematical 
creation that it will go a long way toward ensuring that mathematics class is a place where 
                                                 
7 Efforts that seek to both reconceptualize mathematics and to apply the reconceptualization for social 
betterment deserve the highest praise.  An example of this vein of scholarship is Jo Boaler’s work to 
broaden what we mean by mathematical rationality and to apply it to making school mathematics more 
inclusive.  See, for example, Boaler (1997) Boaler and Greeno (2000).  Gutstein also engages in thoughtful 
philosophical reconstruction in his project and accordingly he also deserves recognition. Since his 
philosophizing operates instrumentally as a means to support his pedagogy, I position his overall project 
on the application side of the divide.           
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children’s experiences are grounded in genuine inquiry.  That is, our live, human problems could 
serve as a starting point for the teaching and learning of mathematics in class.  The value of what 
gets taught and learned there could be measured against how well the products of mathematics 
class address the initial problem.  Recalling this essay’s opening claim that mathematics should be 
thought of a form of intentional human activity, I hope that this exploration has helped to render 
a vision of school mathematics in which students are encouraged to engage in intentional ethical 
activity to identify problems that lend themselves to mathematical inquiry and that they 
meaningfully engage in “doin’ the math.”                   
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